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Abstract	  Although	   contemporary	   theorists	   of	   revolution	   usually	   claim	   to	   be	   incorporating	  international	  dynamics	  in	  their	  analysis,	  ‘the	  international’	  remains	  a	  residual	  feature	  of	  revolutionary	  theory.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	   international	  processes	  are	  seen	  either	  as	  the	  facilitating	   context	   for	   revolutions	   or	   as	   the	   dependent	   outcome	   of	   revolutions.	   The	  result	  is	  an	  analytical	  bifurcation	  between	  international	  and	  domestic	  in	  which	  the	  former	  serves	  as	  the	  backdrop	  to	  the	  latter’s	  causal	  agency.	  This	  paper	  demonstrates	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  fuller	  engagement	  between	  revolutionary	  theory	  and	  ‘the	  international’.	  It	  does	  so	  in	  three	  steps:	  first,	  the	  paper	  examines	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  contemporary	  revolutionary	  theory	  apprehends	  ‘the	  international’;	  second,	  it	  lays	  out	  the	  descriptive	  and	  analytical	  advantages	   of	   an	   ‘intersocietal’	   approach;	   and	   third,	   it	   traces	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  international	   dynamics	   help	   to	   constitute	   revolutionary	   situations,	   trajectories,	   and	  outcomes.	  In	  this	  way,	  revolutions	  are	  understood	  as	  ‘intersocietal’	  all	  the	  way	  down.	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A	  long	  time	  ago	  in	  a	  country	  far,	  far	  away	  In	   1791,	   a	   rebellion	   broke	   out	   in	   the	   French	   colony	   of	   Saint-­‐Domingue,	   the	   smaller,	  western	   part	   of	   the	   island	   of	   Hispaniola,	   situated	   not	   far	   from	   Cuba.	   Although	   Saint-­‐Domingue	  was	  small,	  it	  enjoyed	  a	  lucrative	  role	  in	  the	  world	  economy,	  producing	  half	  of	  the	   world’s	   coffee	   and	   40%	   of	   its	   sugar	   (Klooster	   2009:	   84).	   Saint-­‐Domingue	   was	   a	  colony	  of	  France,	  which	  was	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  the	  island:	  Saint-­‐Domingue	  supplied	  two-­‐thirds	  of	   the	  metropole’s	  overseas	   trade	   (James	  2001/1938:	   xviii).	   So	   substantial	  was	   this	   trade	   that	   the	   value	   of	   crops	   produced	   in	   Saint-­‐Domingue	   during	   the	   1780s	  was	  worth	  more	   to	   the	   French	   treasury	   than	   the	   combined	  merchandise	   returned	   to	  Spain	   from	   all	   of	   its	   colonies	   (Klooster	   2009:	   84;	   Stephanson	   2010:	   199).	   Beyond	   its	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  production	  of	  coffee	  and	  sugar,	  Saint-­‐Domingue	  was	  a	  central	  node	  in	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  tradable	  commodities	  of	  the	  time	  –	  slaves.	  During	  the	  1780s,	  30,000	   slaves	   per	   year	   were	   imported	   from	   Africa	   to	   Saint-­‐Domingue	   (Stephanson	  2010:	  204).	  As	  a	  result,	   the	   island	  was	  home	  to	  the	   largest	  population	  of	  slaves	   in	  the	  region:	  slaves	  represented	  89%	  of	  the	  island’s	  population	  (Hunt	  2010:	  26).	  These	  slaves	  were	  highly	  valuable	  –	  they	  were	  worth	  three	  times	  as	  much	  as	  the	  value	  of	  the	  land	  and	  buildings	   in	   the	   colony	   combined	   (Klooster	   2009:	   91).	   But	   despite	   their	   value,	   slaves	  were	   subject	   to	   abject	   conditions	   both	   on	   the	   passage	   to	   Saint-­‐Domingue	   and	   during	  their	  time	  in	  the	  colony	  itself	  (Blackburn	  1986;	  Linebaugh	  and	  Rediker	  2000).	  Whipping	  was	   an	   everyday	  part	   of	   life	   on	   the	   estates	   and	  plantations,	  while	   strict	   punishments	  were	   meted	   out	   to	   those	   who	   tried	   to	   escape:	   branding	   and	   severed	   ears	   for	   a	   first	  offence;	  further	  branding	  and	  severed	  hamstrings	  for	  a	  second	  offence;	  execution	  for	  a	  third	   offence	   (Klooster	   2009:	   92).	   Large	   numbers	   of	   slaves	   died	   from	  mistreatment,	  malnourishment,	   and	   disease.	   For	   those	   who	   survived,	   their	   lives	   were	   ones	   of	  immiseration	  and	  indignity.	  	  	  Although	  Saint-­‐Domingue	  was	  home	  to	  a	  number	  of	  slave	  revolts	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  the	  1791	  rebellion	  had	  a	  more	  pronounced	  edge	  than	  those	  that	  had	  gone	  before.	  Partly	   this	  was	  due	   to	   the	  broader	  context	  of	  upheaval	   that	   followed	   the	  French	  Revolution	  of	  1789,	  an	  event	  of	  consequence	  not	  just	  for	  France,	  but	  also	  for	  its	  overseas	   possessions.	   Indeed,	   the	   victory	   of	   the	   revolutionaries	   in	   France	   allowed	  Domingue’s	  gens	  de	  couleur	  –	  an	  elite	  minority	  of	  freed	  slaves	  and	  mixed	  race	  European-­‐Africans	  (mulattos)	  –	   to	   lobby	  the	  new	  government	   in	  Paris	   for	   the	  recognition	  of	   full	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political	   and	   civil	   rights.	   These	   rights	  were	   denied	   under	   the	   Saint-­‐Dominguan	   ‘Code	  Noir’,	  an	  act	  that	  reserved	  a	  number	  of	  professions	  for	  whites	  and	  forbade	  blacks	  from	  adopting	   a	   range	   of	   cultural	   practices,	   including	   dressing	   like	  whites	   (Klooster	   2009:	  89).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  colonial	  elite	  (grands	  blancs)	  saw	  the	  1789	  revolution	  as	  an	  opportunity	   to	   lobby	   for	   commercial	   autonomy	   from	   the	  metropole,	   something	  made	  pressing	   by	   heightened	   inter-­‐imperial	   competition	   which,	   amongst	   other	   things,	  fostered	  metropolitan	  demands	  for	  exclusionary	  trade	  regimes	  (Adelman	  2008:	  327-­‐8).	  In	   this,	   they	  were	  aided	  by	   ideas	  of	  self-­‐rule	  and	  nativism,	  which	  acted	   to	  reconfigure	  notions	  of	  sovereignty	  within	  imperial	  territories.	  They	  were	  also	  aided	  by	  an	  uprising	  amongst	   black	   slaves	   in	   the	   northern	   part	   of	   the	   country,	  where	   ‘protest	  was	   part	   of	  everyday	   life’	   (Klooster	  2009:	  91).	   Initially,	   the	  demands	  of	   the	  slaves	  were	   limited	  to	  the	  abolition	  of	  reviled	  practices,	  most	  notably	  the	  use	  of	  the	  whip.	  Over	  time,	  however,	  slave	  demands	  became	  more	  radical,	  cultivating	  a	  movement	  that	  sought	  the	  overthrow	  of	  slavery,	  mulatto	  domination,	  and	  French	  colonialism.	  This	  uprising	  was	  to	  have	  major	  repercussions	  not	  just	  for	  Saint-­‐Domingue,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  wider	  world.	  	  	  The	   revolutionary	   struggle	   in	   Saint-­‐Domingue	   was	   long	   and	   bloody. 1 	  In	   1800,	  insurgents	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Toussaint	  Louverture,	   Jean-­‐Jacques	  Dessalines,	  and	  Henri	   Christophe	   forced	   an	   initial	   French	   surrender.	   After	   a	   further	   period	   of	   re-­‐invasion	   and	   bloodletting	   in	   which	   tens	   of	   thousands	   were	   killed	   on	   both	   sides,	   the	  revolutionaries	   forced	   a	   second,	   final	   French	   surrender	   in	   November	   1803.	   On	   1st	  January	   1804,	   Dessalines	   became	   Governor-­‐General	   of	   the	   independent	   republic	   of	  Haiti,	   the	   name	   given	   to	   the	   territory	   by	   the	   indigenous	   Tairo	   people.	   The	   successful	  revolution	   in	  Haiti	   had	   cascading	  effects.	   In	  France,	   it	   became	   increasingly	  difficult	   to	  square	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   1789	   revolution	   –	   liberty,	   equality,	   fraternity	   –	  with	   the	  slave	  trade,	  particularly	  after	  the	  Haitian	  uprising	  demonstrated	  the	  capacity	  of	  slaves	  to	  resist,	  fight,	  and	  govern	  for	  themselves,	  and	  all	  against	  the	  largest	  French	  Army	  ever	  to	   have	   been	   sent	   overseas.	   Even	   before	   the	   revolution	   in	   Saint-­‐Domingue	   had	   been	  concluded,	   the	   universality	   of	   discourse	   around	   rights	   was	   challenged	   by	   racial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  article,	  revolutionary	  struggles	  are	  considered	  in	  a	  broad	  sense,	  i.e.	  as	  contestations	  over	  state	  power	  sustained	  by	  mass	  mobilization,	  an	  ideology	  of	  social	  justice,	  and	  an	  attempt	  to	  enact	  forceful	  institutional	  change	  (Goldstone	  2014:	  4).	  Successful	  revolutions	  are	  the	  rapid,	  mass,	  forceful,	  systemic	  transformation	  of	  a	  society’s	  political,	  economic,	  and	  symbolic	  relations	  (Lawson	  Forthcoming).	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discrimination,	   leading	   to	  debates	  over	  whether	   the	  revolutionary	  constitution	  should	  be	  extended	  to	   the	  colonies.	  The	  Society	  of	   the	  Friends	  of	   the	  Blacks	  (Société	  des	  Amis	  
des	   Noirs),	   led	   by	   major	   revolutionary	   figures	   including	   Brissot,	   Condorcet,	   and	  Mirabeau,	   argued	   that	   slavery	   could	   not	   stand	   alongside	   revolutionary	   claims	   of	  universal	   rights	   and	   equality.	   In	   April	   1792,	  male	   gens	   de	   couleur	   in	   Saint-­‐Domingue	  were	   granted	   full	   civil	   rights.	   The	   following	   year,	   the	   French	   colonial	   commissioners	  abolished	   slavery	   in	   the	   territory.	   In	   1793,	   Jean-­‐Baptiste	   Belley,	   a	   gens	   de	   couleur	  representing	  northern	  Saint-­‐Domingue,	  became	  the	  first	  non-­‐white	  to	  take	  up	  a	  seat	  in	  the	   National	   Assembly.	   And	   in	   February	   1794,	   the	   revolutionary	   regime	   in	   Paris	  extended	  emancipation	  throughout	  the	  French	  colonies.	  In	  Britain	  too,	  the	  experience	  of	  Haiti	  and	  other	  slave	  rebellions	  acted	  as	  a	  spur	  to	  the	  abolitionist	  movement.	  Although	  both	   colonialism	   and	   slavery	   proved	   to	   be	   resilient	   features	   of	   nineteenth	   century	  international	   order,	   the	  Haitian	   revolution	   served	   as	   a	   catalyst	   for	   debates	   that,	   over	  time,	   deinstitutionalized	   slavery	   and	   formal	   racial	   discrimination	   around	   the	   world	  (Geggus	  2002,	  2010;	  Shilliam	  2008).	  	  	  Further	  afield,	  the	  revolution	  ended	  Saint-­‐Domingue’s	  role	  as	  a	  major	  exporter	  of	  sugar	  and	   coffee,	   presaging	   the	   relative	   decline	   of	   the	   Caribbean	   within	   global	   economic	  circuits	  (Geggus	  2010:	  85).	  It	  also	  presaged	  a	  shift	  in	  relative	  power	  within	  the	  Americas	  –	  after	  the	  defeat	  in	  Haiti,	  Napoleon	  effectively	  abandoned	  the	  French	  imperial	  project	  in	  the	  region,	  selling	   ‘Louisiana’	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  greatly	  adding	  to	  the	   territory	   and	   capabilities	   of	   the	  United	   States.	   The	   effects	   of	   this	   reorientation	   in	  French	  policy	  also	  had	  a	  number	  of	  unintended	  consequences.	  Napoleon’s	  occupation	  of	  Spain	   and	   Portugal	   in	   1807-­‐8	   provided	   a	   window	   of	   opportunity	   for	   independence	  movements	  throughout	  Hispanic	  America.	  These	  movements	  were,	  in	  turn,	  encouraged	  by	   the	   revolutionary	   government	   in	   Haiti,	   particularly	   the	   administration	   in	   the	  southern	   part	   of	   the	   country	   led	   by	   Alexandre	   Pétion,	   which	   first	   sheltered	   Simon	  Bolívar	  and	  then	  supported	  his	  struggle	  for	   independence	  in	  return	  for	  a	  commitment	  to	   abolish	   slavery.	   Pétion	   argued	   that	   the	   Americas	   should	   be	   made	   free	   of	   Spanish	  ‘monsters’,	  and	  called	  for	  both	  Africans	  and	  Amerindians	  to	  settle	  in	  Haiti	  (Geggus	  2010:	  99).	  The	  example	  of	  Haiti	  acted	  as	  a	   spur	   to	   further	  uprisings	   in	   the	  region,	   including	  those	   in	   Jamaica,	   Grenada,	   St	   Vincent,	   St	   Lucia,	  Martinique,	   and	  Guadalupe.	   Indeed,	   it	  could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   Haitian	   revolution	   formed	   part	   of	   a	   transnational	   field	   of	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contention	  that	  was	  constituted	  not	  just	  in	  the	  Americas	  and	  the	  Caribbean,	  but	  which	  incorporated	  South	  Asia,	  East	  Asia,	  and	  the	  Arabian	  Gulf	  (Armitage	  and	  Subraymanyan,	  2010:	  xx-­‐xxi).	  	  	  In	  sum,	  therefore,	  multiple	  strands	  of	  late-­‐eighteenth	  century	  international	  order	  were	  brought	   into	  question	  by	   the	  Haitian	   revolution:	   the	   superiority	  of	  European	  coercive	  power;	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  colonial	  rule;	  an	  economic	  system	  premised	  on	  the	  trafficking	  of	  African	  slaves;	  and	  the	  doctrine	  of	  racial	  superiority	  that	  underlay	  the	  system	  itself.	  In	   the	  Haitian	  revolution	  can	  be	   found	  many	  of	   the	  dynamics	   that	  underpinned	  world	  politics	  over	   the	  ensuing	   two	  centuries:	   the	  extension	  of	   capitalism	  around	   the	  world	  and	  the	  development	  of	  movements	  intended	  to	  counter	  its	  inequities;	  the	  expansion	  of	  European	  colonialism	  and	  the	  many	  forms	  of	  resistance	  that	  rose	  up	  against	  it;	  and	  the	  circulation	   of	   contentious	   repertoires,	   particularly	   around	   ideas	   of	   rights,	  independence,	   and	   equality,	   which	   served	   as	   the	   ‘world	   cultural	   scripts’	   for	   later	  uprisings	   in	   Europe,	   South	   Asia,	   the	   Americas,	   Indochina,	   and	   parts	   of	   Africa	   (Beck	  2011).	  It	  may	  be	  stretching	  the	  point	  to	  follow	  C.L.R.	  James	  (2001:	  305)	  in	  asserting	  that	  ‘what	  took	  place	  in	  French	  Saint-­‐Domingue	  in	  1792-­‐1804	  reappeared	  in	  Cuba	  in	  1958’	  –	  Haitian	  slaves	  neither	  started	  history	  afresh	  nor	  engendered	  world	  revolution.	  But	  by	  fundamentally	  altering	  the	  conditions	  of	   their	  servitude,	  Haiti’s	  revolutionaries	  served	  as	  an	  inspiration	  for	  others,	  affecting	  both	  the	  region	  around	  them	  and	  broader	  currents	  of	  world	  historical	  development.	  Although	  the	  French	  Revolution	  has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  quintessential	  modern	   revolution,	   it	  may	  be	   that	  Haiti	   is	   a	  better	   exemplar	  of	   the	  dynamics	  that	  animate	  both	  the	  study	  and	  practice	  of	  revolution.2	  	  	  If	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   it	   seems	   curious	   that	   Haiti	   is	   not	   a	   better-­‐known	   instance	   of	  revolutionary	   change.	   Haiti	   plays	   little-­‐to-­‐no	   role	   in	   landmark	   studies	   of	   the	   Atlantic	  ‘age	  of	   revolution’	   (e.g.	  Palmer	  1959,	  1964;	  Hobsbawm	  1962).	  The	   impact	  of	  Haiti	   on	  the	   French	   Revolution	   goes	   largely	   unobserved	   (e.g.	   Rudé	   1964;	   Furet	   1999;	   Stone	  2002).	   And	  Haiti	   serves	   only	   as	   a	   footnote	  within	   general	   studies	   of	   the	   subject	   (e.g.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Or	  perhaps	  it	  is	  better	  to	  take	  both	  cases	  together.	  The	  Haitian	  revolutionaries	  were	  labeled	  by	  C.L.R.	  James	  (2001)	  as	  the	  ‘black	  Jacobins’	  in	  order	  to	  stress	  the	  many	  connections	  between	  the	  revolutionary	  forces	  and	  their	  counterparts	  in	  France.	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Foran	   2005).3	  	   In	   fact,	   it	   has	   been	   left	   primarily	   to	   historians	   to	   demonstrate	   the	  centrality	   of	   the	   Haitian	   Revolution	   to	   the	   international	   relations	   of	   the	   period	   (e.g.	  Klooster	   2009;	   Hunt	   2010;	   Popkin	   2010).	   These	   studies	   demonstrate	   both	   the	  transnational	   features	   of	   the	   Haitian	   revolution	   and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   a	   ‘peripheral’	  territory	   was	   generative	   of	   discourse	   and	   policy	   in	   the	   ‘metropole’.	   Although	   Eric	  Hobsbawm	  (1962:	  4)	  argued	  that	  ‘the	  world	  revolution	  spread	  outward	  from	  the	  double	  crater	  of	  England	  and	  France’,	   the	  experience	  of	  the	  Haitian	  revolution	  reveals	  a	  more	  polycentric	  character	  to	  the	  modern	  experience	  of	  revolution.	  	  	  
Revolutions	  and	  the	  international	  The	   relative	   neglect	   of	   the	   Haitian	   revolution	   illustrates	   two	   important	   points	   about	  scholarship	   on	   revolutions.	   First,	   it	   indicates	   that	   revolutionary	   theory	   contains	   a	  blindspot,	   one	   shared	  with	  many	  other	  areas	  of	   the	   social	   sciences,	  which	  prevents	   it	  from	   addressing	   the	   constitutive	   role	   played	   by	   ‘backward’	   places	   in	  more	   ‘advanced’	  polities	   (Go	   2013;	   Shilliam	   2008).	  Much	   of	   the	  modern	   academy	   is	   oriented	   towards	  histories	  and	  theories	  based	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  ‘core’,	  whether	  such	  accounts	  are	  laudatory	   or	   critical.	   The	   multiple	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   Haitian	   Revolution	   impacted	  broader	  transnational	  currents	  are	  a	  warning	  that	  such	  a	  focus	  is	  somewhere	  between	  limited	  and	  misleading.	  This	  point,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  article.	  Rather,	  the	   article	   is	   concerned	   with	   a	   second	   issue	   raised	   by	   the	   neglect	   of	   the	   Haitian	  revolution	  –	   that	   there	   is	  something	  amiss	  with	  how	  revolutionary	  theory	  approaches	  ‘the	  international’.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  particular	  reasons	  why	  Haiti	  has	   been	   downplayed	   in	   the	   study	   of	   revolutions,	   Haiti	   also	   reveals	   a	   more	   general	  shortcoming	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  scholarship	  on	  revolutions	  treats	  ‘the	  international’.	  	  This	  may	  seem	   like	  an	  odd	  claim	  to	  make.	  After	  all,	   revolutionaries	   from	  Toussaint	   to	  Khomeini	   have	   long	   held	   that	   the	   international	   system	   –	   whether	   understood	   as	  colonial,	   capitalist,	   racist,	   or	   a	   combination	   of	   all	   three	   –	   operates	   as	   a	   structure	   of	  oppression.	   Given	   this,	   it	   is	   no	   surprise	   to	   find	   that,	   for	   most	   revolutionaries,	  internationalism	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	   response	  to	  the	   inequities	  of	  global	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  One	  notable	  exception	  within	  revolutionary	  scholarship	  is	  Eric	  Selbin	  (2010:	  143),	  who	  argues	  that	  Haiti	  is	  ‘the	  world’s	  most	  important	  revolutionary	  process’,	  albeit	  one	  that	  ‘virtually	  everyone	  ignores’.	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structures.	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  (1967:	  46-­‐7)	  thought	  that	  communism	  could	  not	  exist	  ‘as	  a	  local	   event.	   The	   proletariat	   can	   only	   exist	   on	   the	   world-­‐historical	   plane,	   just	   as	  communism,	   its	   activity,	   can	   only	   have	   a	   world	   historical	   existence’.	   Trotsky	   (1997)	  famously	   spoke	   of	   the	   need	   for	   ‘permanent	   revolution’	   in	   order	   to	   stoke	   the	   fires	   of	  global	   insurrection;	  Lenin’s	  analysis	   ran	  along	  similar	   lines:	   ‘global	  class,	  global	  party,	  global	   revolution’	   (Weltklasse,	   Weltpartei,	   Weltrevolution)	   (in	   Halliday	   2008:	   70).	  Ayatollah	   Khomeini	   also	   invoked	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   revolutions	   must	   challenge	  international	  order:	  ‘state	  boundaries	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  deficient	  human	  mind	  …	  The	  revolution	   does	   not	   recognize	   borders	   and	   frontiers,	   it	   will	   go	   through	   them’	   (in	  Abrahamian	   1993:	   49).	   And	   Che	   Guevara	   (1968:	   62)	   turned	   internationalism	   into	   a	  ‘battle	  cry’	  of	  anti-­‐imperialism	  in	  his	  ‘Message	  to	  the	  People	  of	  the	  World’:	  	  	   How	   close	   and	   bright	   would	   the	   future	   appear	   if	   two,	   three,	   many	  Vietnams	   flowered	   on	   the	   face	   of	   the	   globe	   …	   what	   difference	   do	   the	  dangers	   to	  a	  human	  being	  or	  people	  matter	  when	  what	   is	  at	  stake	   is	   the	  destiny	  of	  humanity.	  Our	  every	  action	   is	  a	  battle	  cry	  against	   imperialism	  and	  a	  call	  for	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  peoples.	  	  	  If	   revolutionaries	   have	   long	   pointed	   to	   the	   necessarily	   international	   components	   of	  their	   struggles,	   many	   revolutionary	   theorists	   also	   claim	   to	   have	   incorporated	   the	  international	   aspects	   of	   revolutions	   into	   their	   analyses.	   In	   response	   to	   the	   relative	  neglect	  of	  international	  factors	  by	  ‘first’	  and	  ‘second’	  generation	  scholarship,	  beginning	  in	   the	   1970s,	   ‘third	   generation’	   revolutionary	   theorists	   (e.g.	   Goldfrank	   1975,	   1979;	  Skocpol	  1979;	  Tilly	  1990;	  Goldstone	  1991;	  Katz	  1997)	  included	  a	  range	  of	  international	  factors	   in	   their	   accounts.4	  Goldfrank	   (1979:	   143,	   148-­‐51)	   argued	   that	   the	   roots	   of	  revolutions	   lay	   in	  the	   ‘world	  capitalist	  system’	  and	  its	   ‘intensive	   international	   flows	  of	  commodities,	  investments,	  and	  laborers’,	  ‘great	  power	  configurations’	  (such	  as	  a	  shift	  in	  the	   balance	   of	   power),	   a	   ‘favorable	   world	   situation’	   (such	   as	   changing	   client-­‐patron	  relations),	   and	   a	   ‘general	   world	   context’	   (such	   as	   a	   world	   war,	   which	   served	   to	  preoccupy	  great	  powers).	  Skocpol	  (1979:	  14)	   famously	  argued	  that	   ‘social	  revolutions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  idea	  of	  there	  being	  several	  ‘generations’	  of	  scholarship	  on	  revolutions	  stems	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Lawrence	  Stone	  (1966)	  and	  Jack	  Goldstone	  (2001).	  Although	  such	  an	  approach	  can	  foster	  an	  overly	  tidy	  picture	  of	  the	  development	  of	  revolutionary	  theory,	  and	  uproot	  20th	  and	  21st	  century	  approaches	  from	  their	  classical	  heritages,	  there	  are	  two	  benefits	  to	  thinking	  in	  generational	  terms:	  first,	  it	  works	  as	  a	  heuristic	  device	  by	  which	  to	  parse	  theories	  of	  revolution;	  and	  second,	  it	  helps	  to	  illuminate	  the	  development	  of	  a	  self-­‐conscious	  canon	  in	  the	  study	  of	  revolutions.	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cannot	  be	  explained	  without	  systematic	  reference	  to	  international	  structures	  and	  world	  historical	   development’	   (emphasis	   in	   original).	   Skocpol	   (1973:	   30-­‐1;	   1979:	   19-­‐24)	  highlighted	   the	   formative	   role	   played	   by	   two	   international	   factors	   in	   the	   onset	   of	  revolutions:	   the	   uneven	   spread	   of	   capitalism	   and	   inter-­‐state	   (particularly	   military)	  competition.	   Both	   of	   these	   factors	   were	   embedded	   within	   ‘world	   historical	   time’,	   by	  which	   Skocpol	   (1979:	   23)	   meant	   the	   overarching	   context	   within	   which	   inter-­‐state	  competition	   and	   capitalist	   development	   took	  place.	   Tilly	   (1990:	   186)	   also	   highlighted	  the	   importance	   of	   inter-­‐state	   competition,	   arguing	   that:	   ‘All	   of	   Europe’s	   great	  revolutions,	   and	   many	   of	   its	   lesser	   ones,	   began	   with	   the	   strains	   imposed	   by	   war’.5	  Goldstone	  (1991:	  24-­‐5,	  459-­‐60)	  widened	  this	  focus	  by	  noting	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  rising	  populations	   across	   a	   range	   of	   territories	   served	   to	   foster	   state	   fiscal	   crises	   (by	  increasing	  prices	  and	  decreasing	  tax	  revenues),	  heighten	  elite	  fracture	  (as	  competition	  between	  patronage	  networks	  was	  sharpened),	  and	  prompt	  popular	  uprisings	  (as	  wages	  declined	   in	   real	   terms).	   Finally,	   Katz	   (1997:	   13,	   29)	   noted	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   ‘central	  revolutions’	   (such	  as	  France	   in	  1789	  and	  Egypt	   in	  1952)	   fostered	   ‘waves’	  of	   ‘affiliated	  revolutions’	  (also	  see:	  Markoff	  1996;	  Sohrabi	  2002;	  Beck	  2011).	  	  	  The	  ‘retrieval’	  of	  the	  international	  by	  third	  generation	  revolutionary	  theorists	  has	  been	  extended	  by	  a	  number	  of	  ‘fourth	  generation’	  theorists	  (e.g.	  Goldstone	  2001,	  2009,	  2014;	  Foran	   2005;	   Kurzman,	   2008;	   Beck	   2011,	   2014).	   As	   discussed	   below,	   of	   John	   Foran’s	  (2005)	  five	  ‘indispensible	  conditions’	  that	  have	  enabled	  revolutions	  in	  the	  Third	  World	  to	  take	  place,	  two	  –	  dependent	  development	  and	  world-­‐systemic	  opening	  –	  are	  overtly	  international.	   Charles	  Kurzman	   (2008)	  has	  noted	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   a	   global	  wave	  of	  democratic	   revolutions	   in	   the	   early	   part	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   spread	   over	   widely	  dispersed	   territories,	   from	  Mexico	   to	  China.	  Kurzman	  (2008:	  8)	  argues	   that	   this	  wave	  acted	   as	   a	   ‘dress	   rehearsal’	   for	   later	   events,	   most	   notably	   the	   1989	   revolutions	   in	  Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe.	   Colin	   Beck	   (2011:	   193)	   sees	   such	   waves	   as	   likely	   to	  increase	   ‘as	   the	   level	   of	  world	   culture	  more	   rapidly	   expands’,	   an	   argument	   that	   finds	  support	   in	  Mark	  Beissinger’s	  (2014:	  16-­‐17)	  database	  of	  revolutionary	  episodes,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Despite	  this	  statement,	  Tilly’s	  concern	  with	  the	  generative	  power	  of	  warfare	  was	  integrated	  more	  into	  his	  analysis	  of	  state-­‐formation	  than	  it	  was	  into	  his	  account	  of	  revolutions.	  Indeed,	  the	  role	  of	  war	  (or	  any	  international	  factor)	  in	  fostering	  revolutionary	  situations	  is	  absent	  from	  Tilly’s	  (1978)	  major	  work	  on	  the	  subject	  –	  From	  
Mobilization	  to	  Revolution.	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shows	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  both	  the	  depth	  and	  breadth	  of	  revolutionary	  waves	  over	  the	  past	   century.	   Jack	   Goldstone	   (2014:	   19,	   21-­‐2)	   lists	   a	   variety	   of	   ways	   through	   which	  ‘favorable	   international	   relations’	   serve	   as	   the	   conditions	   for	   societal	   instability,	   plus	  lists	   a	   range	   of	   factors,	   from	   demographic	   changes	   (such	   as	   rising	   populations)	   to	  shifting	   inter-­‐state	   relations	   (such	   as	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   external	   support	   for	   a	   client	  regime),	  by	  which	  international	  processes	  help	  to	  cause	  revolutions.6	  	  	  Given	  this	  proliferation	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  international	  components	  of	  revolutions,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  contemporary	  revolutionary	  scholarship	  has	  solved	  the	  ‘problem’	  of	  the	  international.	  Many	   contemporary	  works	   are	   replete	  with	   references	   to	   transnational	  empirical	   connections	   (such	   as	   revolutionary	   repertoires	   that	   cross	   borders),	   while	  international	   factors	   are	   often	   seen	   as	   the	   precipitant	   cause	   of	   revolutions	   (through	  relations	   of	   dependent	   development),	   and	   as	   the	   direct	   outcomes	   of	   revolutions	  (through	  inducing	  inter-­‐state	  conflict).	  It	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  these	  accounts	  have	  gone	  a	  considerable	  way	   to	  opening	  up	  a	  productive	  exchange	  between	  revolutionary	  theory	  and	   ‘the	   international’	   –	   this	  article	  aims	   to	  build	  on	   the	   insights	  of	  Goldfrank,	  Skocpol,	   Goldstone,	   Foran,	   Kurzman,	   Selbin,	   Beck,	   and	   other	   pioneers.	   However,	   the	  article	  also	  seeks	  to	  extend	  the	  insights	  of	  this	  scholarship	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  'the	  international'	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   theorized	   ‘all	   the	   way	   down’.	   There	   are	   three	  motivations	  that	  lie	  behind	  this	  claim.	  First,	  despite	  increasing	  attention	  to	  the	  multiple	  connections	   between	   revolutions	   and	   the	   international,	   this	   relationship	   remains	  unevenly	  examined,	  being	  highly	  visible	  in	  some	  work	  (e.g.	  Foran	  2005;	  Kurzman	  2008;	  Selbin	  2010;	  Goldstone	  2014;	  Beck	  2014),	  yet	  all	  but	  invisible	  in	  others	  (e.g.	  Parsa	  2000;	  Goodwin	  2001;	  Thompson	  2004;	  Slater	  2010).7	  Clearly	  there	  is	  much	  still	  to	  do	  in	  terms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Such	  fourth	  generation	  scholarship	  sits	  in	  parallel	  to	  recent	  work	  on	  the	  transnational	  dimensions	  of	  contentious	  politics,	  which	  stresses	  the	  co-­‐constitutive	  relationship	  between	  domestic	  and	  international	  mechanisms	  (Tarrow	  2005,	  2011,	  2013;	  Bob	  2005,	  2012;	  Carpenter	  2014;	  Weyland	  2014).	  The	  word	  ‘parallel’	  is	  used	  advisedly.	  With	  relatively	  few	  exceptions	  (e.g.	  Tarrow	  2012:	  ch.	  4;	  Tarrow	  2013:	  ch.	  2),	  debates	  on	  contentious	  politics	  and	  non-­‐violent	  protests	  are	  not	  well	  integrated	  into	  the	  study	  of	  revolutions.	  And,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  revolutionary	  scholarship,	  the	  international	  is	  unevenly	  integrated	  into	  this	  analysis,	  playing	  a	  major	  role	  in	  Tarrow	  (2013),	  a	  minor	  role	  in	  Nepstad	  (2011),	  and	  virtually	  no	  role	  in	  Chenoweth	  and	  Stephan	  (2011).	  	  7	  Parsa’s	  (2000)	  deployment	  of	  the	  international	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  ad	  hoc	  activities	  of	  international	  organizations	  (such	  as	  the	  IMF)	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (such	  as	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross).	  Goodwin’s	  (2001)	  use	  of	  the	  international	  is	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of	   ‘mainstreaming’	   international	   factors	   into	  the	  analysis	  of	  revolutions.	  Second,	  usage	  of	   the	   international	   is	   often	   reduced	   to	   a	   handful	   of	   factors.	   In	   Skocpol’s	   analysis,	   for	  example,	   inter-­‐state	   competition	   is	   a	   surrogate	   for	   military	   interactions,	   particularly	  defeat	  in	  war.	  Hence:	  ‘wars	  …	  are	  the	  midwives	  of	  revolutionary	  crises’	  (Skocpol	  1979:	  286).	  As	  the	  next	  section	  shows,	  such	  a	  view	  neglects	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  cornucopia	  of	  international	   processes,	   from	   transnational	   cultural	   repertoires	   to	   inter-­‐state	   alliance	  structures,	   affect	   the	   onset	   of	   revolutions.	   Third,	  much	   revolutionary	   scholarship	   has	  incorporated	  international	  factors	  via	  a	  strategy	  of	  ‘add	  international	  and	  stir’,	  grafting	  international	   factors	  onto	   existing	   theoretical	   scaffolding	   rather	   than	   integrating	   such	  factors	  within	  a	  single	  framework.	  This	  point	  is	  worth	  examining	  in	  more	  depth.	  	  	  In	  John	  Foran’s	  (2005:	  18-­‐23)	  influential	  work,	  revolutions	  in	  the	  Third	  World	  are	  seen	  as	   emerging	   from	   the	   interaction	   of	   five	   ‘indispensible	   conditions’:	   dependent	  development	   (which	   exacerbates	   social	   tensions);	   exclusionary,	   personalistic	   regimes	  (which	   polarize	   opposition);	   political	   cultures	   of	   opposition	   (which	   legitimize	  revolutionary	  movements);	  economic	  downturns	  (which	  radicalize	  these	  movements);	  and	  a	  world-­‐systemic	  opening	  (which	  denotes	  a	  ‘let-­‐up’	  of	  external	  constraints).	  Two	  of	  Foran’s	   five	   causal	   conditions	   are	   overtly	   international:	   dependent	   development	   and	  world-­‐systemic	  opening.	  Yet	  these	  factors	  contain	  little	  by	  way	  of	  causal	  force.	  The	  first,	  dependent	  development,	  is	  a	  virtually	  universal	  condition	  of	  core-­‐periphery	  relations	  –	  to	  paraphrase	  Skocpol’s	   (1979:	  34)	  comment	  on	   the	  ubiquity	  of	   ‘relative	  deprivation’:	  what	   ‘peripheral’	   society	   lacks	   widespread	   dependence	   of	   one	   sort	   or	   another	   on	   a	  metropole?	  Even	  given	  Foran’s	  (2005:	  19)	  specific	  rendering	  of	  dependent	  development	  as,	   following	   Cardoso	   and	   Faletto	   (1979),	   Evans	   (1979),	   and	   Roxborough	   (1989),	   a	  particular	  process	  of	  accumulation	  (‘growth	  within	  limits’),	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  concept	  is	  wide	   enough	   to	   be	   applicable	   to	   almost	   every	   ‘Third	  World’	   state.	   This	   is	   something	  borne	   out	   by	   Foran’s	   (2005:	   255)	   own	   analysis,	   in	   which	   dependent	   development	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  limited	  to	  the	  observation	  that	  states	  inhabit	  an	  international	  system	  of	  states.	  Thompson	  (2004)	  barely	  mentions	  international	  factors	  at	  all.	  Slater’s	  (2010)	  account	  of	  south-­‐east	  Asian	  revolutionary	  movements	  explicitly	  excludes	  the	  international	  dimensions	  of	  these	  movements	  from	  the	  book’s	  theoretical	  apparatus,	  even	  while	  the	  empirical	  sections	  of	  his	  book	  are	  saturated	  with	  such	  factors.	  Such	  a	  bifurcation	  parallels	  Barrington	  Moore’s	  (1967:	  214)	  account	  of	  revolutions,	  which	  reduced	  the	  theoretical	  impact	  of	  international	  forces	  to	  ‘fortuitous	  circumstances’	  even	  as	  his	  empirical	  account	  relied	  heavily	  on	  them	  (on	  this	  point,	  see	  Skocpol	  1973).	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appears	   as	   a	   near	   constant	   of	   both	   successful	   and	   unsuccessful	   revolutions.8	  In	   other	  words,	   the	   causal	  weight	   attributed	   to	  dependent	  development	   is	   nil:	   it	   serves	   as	   the	  background	   condition	   within	   which	   revolutions	   may	   or	   may	   not	   take	   place.	   In	   this	  sense,	   to	   posit	   relations	   between	   polities	   as	   dependent	   is	   less	   to	   assert	   a	   causal	  relationship	   than	   it	   is	   to	  describe	   the	  condition	  of	  most	   ‘peripheral’	   states	  around	   the	  world.	   Without	   further	   specificity	   as	   to	   the	   quality	   and	   quantity	   of	   dependent	  development,	   the	   term	   becomes	   little	   more	   than	   an	   inert	   backdrop.	   At	   first	   glance,	  Foran’s	   (2005:	   23)	   second	   ‘international’	   category	   –	   world-­‐systemic	   opening	   –	   (by	  which	  he	  means	  a	  ‘let-­‐up’	  of	  existing	  international	  conditions	  through	  inter-­‐state	  wars,	  depressions,	   and	   other	   such	   crises)	   appears	   to	   be	  more	   promising.	   Yet,	   here	   too,	   the	  causal	  agency	  of	  the	  international	  is	  significantly	  curtailed	  as	  world-­‐systemic	  opening	  is	  seen	  merely	  as	  the	  final	  moment	  through	  which	  the	   ‘revolutionary	  window	  opens	  and	  closes’	  (Foran	  2005:	  252).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  structural	  preconditions	  that	   lie	  behind	  revolutions	   lie	  elsewhere	  –	   in	  domestic	   regime	  type,	  cultures	  of	  opposition,	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions.	  World-­‐systemic	  opening	  is	  the	  final	  curtain	  call	  on	  a	  play	  that	  has	  largely	  taken	  place	  elsewhere.	  	  	  In	   this	   way,	   both	   of	   the	   international	   components	   of	   Foran’s	   analysis	   are	   limited	   to	  walk-­‐on	  roles:	  dependent	  development	  is	  the	  background	  from	  which	  revolutions	  may	  or	  may	   not	   occur;	  world-­‐systemic	   opening	   is	   the	   final	   spark	   of	   a	   crisis	   that	   has	   been	  kindled	   elsewhere.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   sequence	   through	   which	   Foran’s	   multi-­‐causal	  story	   works	   is	   highly	   significant:	   international	   (dependent	   development),	   domestic	  (exclusionary,	   repressive	   regimes),	   domestic	   (cultures	   of	   opposition),	   domestic	  (economic	   downturns),	   international	   (world-­‐systemic	   opening).	   The	   fact	   that	   Foran’s	  sequence	  differentiates	   international	  and	  domestic	   in	  this	  way	  reproduces	  the	  analytic	  bifurcation	  that	  his	  analysis	  –	  and	  fourth	  generation	  theorists	  more	  generally	  –	  hoped	  to	  overcome.	   Such	   a	   bifurcation	   occludes	   the	   myriad	   ways	   in	   which	   Foran’s	   ostensibly	  domestic	   factors	  are	  deeply	  permeated	  by	   the	   international:	  exclusionary	  regimes	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Foran	  lists	  three	  exceptions	  (out	  of	  39	  cases)	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  dependent	  development	  –	  China	  (1911)	  (seen	  as	  a	  partial	  exception),	  Haiti	  (1986),	  and	  Zaire	  (1996).	  Yet	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  these	  cases	  are	  free	  of	  dependent	  development	  in	  any	  meaningful	  sense.	  More	  convincing	  would	  be	  to	  see	  the	  three	  cases	  as	  ultra-­‐reliant	  on	  wider	  metropolitan	  circuits,	  something	  Foran	  (2005:	  254)	  seems	  to	  recognize	  in	  his	  depiction	  of	  Haiti	  and	  Zaire	  as	  cases	  of	  ‘sheer	  underdevelopment’.	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part	  of	  broader	  clusters	  of	  ideologically	  affiliated	  states,	  alliance	  structures,	  and	  client-­‐patron	   relations;	   cultures	   of	   opposition	   are	   local-­‐transnational	   hybrids	   of	   repertoires	  and	   meaning	   systems;	   socio-­‐economic	   conditions	   are	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   market	  forces	  that	  transcend	  state	  borders.	  Rather	  than	  integrate	  the	  international	  throughout	  his	  casual	  sequence,	  Foran’s	  maintains	  an	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  bifurcation	  between	  domestic	  and	  international.	  And	  he	  loads	  the	  causal	  dice	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  former.	  	  	  Foran’s	   deployment	   of	   the	   international	   is	   emblematic	   of	   fourth	   generation	  revolutionary	  scholarship.	  For	  instance,	  Jack	  Goldstone	  (2001:	  146),	  although	  clear	  that	  international	  factors	  contribute	  in	  multifaceted	  ways	  to	  both	  the	  causes	  and	  outcomes	  of	  revolutions,	  is	  equally	  clear	  about	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  that	  exists	  between	  these	  two	  registers:	  	  Although	   the	   international	   environment	   can	   affect	   the	   risks	   of	   revolution	   in	  manifold	   ways,	   the	   precise	   impact	   of	   these	   effects,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   overall	  likelihood	  of	  revolution,	   is	  determined	  primarily	  by	  the	  internal	  relationships	  among	  state	  authorities,	  various	  elites,	  and	  various	  popular	  groups	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  In	   similar	   vein,	   Goldstone’s	   (2014)	   recent	   work	   makes	   much	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  international	   factors	  serve	  as	   important	  conditions	   for,	  and	  causes	  of,	   revolutions.	  Yet	  international	  factors	  largely	  drop	  out	  of	  Goldstone’s	  account	  of	  revolutionary	  processes	  and	  outcomes	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  noting	  the	  propensity	  of	  revolutions	  to	  stoke	  inter-­‐state	  war).	  In	  this	  way,	  even	  revolutionary	  scholarship	  that	  claims	  to	  fully	  incorporate	  international	  factors	  into	  its	  analysis	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  containing	  two	  shortcomings:	  first,	  the	   maintenance	   of	   an	   analytical	   bifurcation	   between	   international	   and	   domestic	  registers;	   and	   second,	   retaining	   a	   residual	   role	   for	   the	   international.	   As	   a	   result,	  attempts	  to	  integrate	  international	  factors	  into	  the	  study	  of	  revolutions	  tend	  to	  fall	  into	  a	   condition	   of:	   'add	   international	   and	   stir'.	   Grafting	   the	   international	   onto	   existing	  theoretical	  scaffolding	  retains	  –	  and	  sometimes	  strengthens,	  albeit	  unintentionally	  –	  the	  bifurcation	  between	  international	  and	  domestic.	  And	  this	  bifurcation	  contains	  an	  (often	  implicit)	   assumption	   that	   the	   former	   serves	  as	   the	   secondary	   dimensions	  of	   the	   latter’s	  
primary	  causal	  agency.	  How	  might	  an	  approach	  that	  sought	  to	  more	  thoroughly	  integrate	  the	  international	  into	  the	  study	  of	  revolutions	  proceed?	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An	  intersocietal	  approach	  In	  generating	  a	  deeper	  integration	  between	  the	  international	  and	  revolutionary	  theory,	  the	  first	   thing	   to	  note	   is	   that	   the	   relatively	   sparse	  accounts	  of	   the	   international	  offered	  by	  scholarship	  on	  revolutions	  is	  matched	  by	  the	  discipline	  ostensibly	  intended	  to	  study	  the	  international	  components	  of	  the	  social	  world:	  International	  Relations	  (IR).	  If	  relatively	  few	   sociologists	   study	   transnational	   or	   global	   dynamics	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   course	  (exceptions	   include	  world	   systems,	  world	   society,	   and	   globalisation	   theorists),	   this	   is	  not	   the	   case	   with	   International	   Relations.	   Yet	   IR	   theorists	   have	   usually	   treated	  revolutions	   as	   problems	   to	   be	   solved	   (e.g.	   Walt	   1996)	   or	   as	   noisy	   interlopers	   (e.g.	  Armstrong	  1993)	  rather	  than	  as	  constitutive	  of	  international	  order	  (Halliday	  1999	  and	  Bukovansky	  2002	  are	  exceptions	  in	  this	  regard).9	  	  	  Rather	   than	   look	   for	  help	   from	  existing	  work	   in	   IR,	   therefore,	   it	   is	  more	  profitable	   to	  begin	  with	   the	  work	   of	   transnational	   historians.	   A	   number	   of	   transnational	   histories	  have	   pointed	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   revolutionary	   events	   contain	   an	   international	  dimension	   that	   supersedes	   the	  national-­‐state	   frame	   (e.g.	   Stone	  2002;	  Armitage,	  2007;	  Adelman	  2008;	  Hunt	  2010).	  To	   take	  one	  example,	   the	  onset	  of	   the	  French	  Revolution	  cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  attention	  to	  the	  expansionist	  policies	  of	  the	  French	  state	  during	  the	  17th	  and	  18th	  centuries	  –	  between	  1650	  and	  1780,	  France	  was	  at	  war	  in	  two	  out	   of	   every	   three	   years.	   This	   bellicosity,	   a	   product	   of	   pressures	   caused	   by	  developments	  in	  rival	  states	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	  factors,	  brought	  increased	  demands	  for	  taxation	   that,	   over	   time,	   engendered	   factionalism	   in	   the	   ancién	   regime	   (Stone	   2002:	  259-­‐60).	   The	   interactive	   dimensions	   of	   international	   relations	   also	   affected	   events	  during	   the	   revolutionary	   period.	   For	   example,	   in	   1792,	   as	   the	   Jacobins	   were	   losing	  influence	   to	   the	   Girondins,	   leading	   Girondins	   pressed	   the	   state	   into	   international	  conflict.10	  As	   France’s	   foreign	   campaigns	   went	   increasingly	   badly,	   the	   Committee	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  If	  the	  rather	  conservative	  agenda	  of	  mainstream	  IR	  provides	  some	  rationale	  for	  this	  omission,	  it	  is	  more	  surprising	  to	  see	  the	  way	  in	  which	  revolutions	  dropped	  off	  the	  radar	  of	  Political	  Science	  and	  Comparative	  Politics	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s.	  My	  thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  reviewer	  for	  raising	  this	  issue.	  It	  may	  be	  that,	  in	  recent	  years,	  revolutions	  are	  making	  a	  comeback	  in	  these	  fields	  –	  see:	  Beissinger	  (2007,	  2014);	  Slater	  (2010);	  Bunce	  and	  Wolchik	  (2007,	  2011).	  	  	  10	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  generalized	  Girondin-­‐Jacobin	  conflict	  was	  a	  personal	  clash	  between	  Brissot	  and	  Robespierre.	  As	  Brissot	  called	  (successfully)	  for	  war	  with	  Austria,	  arguing	  that	  French	  troops	  would	  be	  greeted	  as	  liberators,	  Robespierre	  responded	  with	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Public	  Safety,	  a	  leading	  site	  of	  Jacobin	  authority,	  blamed	  the	  Girondins	  for	  betraying	  the	  revolution	  and	  committed	  France	  to	  a	  process	  of	  domestic	  radicalization:	  the	  Terror.	  In	  this	  way,	  domestic	  political	  friction	  induced	  international	  conflict	  that,	   in	  turn,	  opened	  up	  space	  for	  heightened	  domestic	  polarization.	  The	  Jacobins	  identified	  the	  Girondins	  as	  ‘unrevolutionary’	   traitors,	   speculators,	   and	   hoarders,	   while	   identifying	   themselves	   as	  the	   guardians	   of	   the	   revolution,	   a	   process	   of	   ‘certification’	   that	   prompted	   a	   wave	   of	  militancy,	  most	   notably	   the	   levée	  en	  masse	  (McAdam,	   Tarrow,	   and	   Tilly	   2001:	   323–7;	  Stone	  2002:	  194-­‐208;	  Crépin	  2013).	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   roles	   played	   by	   international	   factors	   in	   both	   fostering	   the	  revolutionary	  situation	  and	  revolutionary	  trajectories	  in	  France,	  international	  relations	  also	   played	   a	   fundamental	   role	   in	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   revolution.	   First,	   the	  revolutionary	   regime	   annexed	   Rhineland	   and	   Belgium,	   and	   helped	   to	   ferment	  republican	  revolution	  in	  several	  neighboring	  countries,	  including	  Holland,	  Switzerland,	  and	  Italy.	  Second,	  the	  revolution	  prompted	  unrest	  throughout	  Europe,	  including	  Ireland,	  where	  a	  rebellion	  against	  English	  rule	  led	  to	  a	  violent	  conflict	  and,	  in	  1800,	  the	  Acts	  of	  Union	  between	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Ireland.	  Third,	  the	  threat	  from	  France	  was	  met	  by	  extensive	  counter-­‐revolution	   in	  neighboring	  states.	   In	  England,	   for	  example,	   habeas	   corpus	   was	   suspended	   in	   1794,	   while	   legislation	   ranging	   from	   the	  Seditious	  Meetings	  Act	  to	  the	  Combination	  Acts	  was	  introduced	  in	  order	  to	  contain	  the	  spread	   of	   republicanism.	   Although	   the	   French	   did	   not	   generate	   an	   international	  revolutionary	  party,	  many	  states	  acted	  as	  if	  they	  had	  done	  just	  this,	  instituting	  domestic	  crackdowns	  in	  order	  to	  guard	  against	  the	  claim	  made	  by	  Jacques-­‐Pierre	  Brissot	  that:	  ‘we	  [the	  French	  revolutionary	  regime]	  cannot	  be	  at	  peace	  until	  all	  Europe	  is	  in	  flames’	  (cited	  in	  Palmer	  1954:	  11).	  	  	  An	   approach	   that	   takes	   seriously	   the	   relationship	   between	   revolutions	   and	   the	  international	   builds	   from	   this	   understanding	   of	   the	   generative	   role	   of	   flows	   between	  and	   across	   borders.	   Such	   an	   approach	   charts	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   relations	   between	  people,	   networks,	   institutions,	   and	   polities	   drive	   revolutionary	   dynamics.	   Recall,	   for	  instance,	   the	  multifaceted	  dimensions	  of	   the	  Haitian	  Revolution:	   its	  embedding	  within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  an	  apposite	  prognosis:	  ‘personne	  n'aime	  les	  missionnaires	  armés’	  (‘no-­‐one	  likes	  armed	  missionaries’).	  This	  is	  a	  lesson	  that	  subsequent	  revolutionaries	  have	  been	  slow	  to	  learn.	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circuits	   of	   capitalist	   accumulation,	   slavery,	   and	   colonialism;	   its	   embroilment	   in	   inter-­‐state	  wars;	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  uprisings	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  Highlighting	   these	   connections	   is	   the	   principal	   contribution	   of	   an	   ‘intersocietal’	  approach	   to	   the	  study	  of	   revolutions.	  The	   term	   ‘intersocietal’	   is	  not	   intended	   to	  mean	  that	   the	  object	  of	  analysis	  must	  be	   ‘societies’	  –	   rather,	   it	   is	   concerned	  with	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  ‘external’	  and	  ‘internal’	  dynamics	  wherever	  these	  are	  found:	  in	  ideas	   that	   cross	   borders,	   amongst	   networks	   of	   revolutionary	   actors,	   in	   asymmetrical	  market	  interactions,	  and	  more.	  In	  fine:	  an	  intersocietal	  approach	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  ways	   in	   which	   differentially	   located,	   but	   interactively	   engaged,	   social	   sites	   affect	   the	  development	  of	  revolutions	  without	  containing	  a	  prior	  presumption	  of	  what	  these	  social	  sites	  are.	  	  	  An	  intersocietal	  approach	  melds	  insights	  from	  both	  IR	  and	  Sociology.	  From	  IR	  comes	  an	  understanding	   of	   the	   international	   sphere	   as	   constituted	   around	   a	   specific	   problem	  –	  how	  order	  can	  be	  maintained	   in	  a	  realm	  featuring	  multiple	  sites	  of	  political	  authority.	  The	   ‘logic	   of	   anarchy’,	   it	   is	   argued,	   produces	   a	   sparse	   realm	   of	   self-­‐help	   in	   which	  geopolitical	  necessities	  prohibit	  the	  emergence	  of	  enduring	  social	  ties	  (e.g.	  Waltz	  1979).	  This	   neglect	   of	   the	   sociological	   features	   of	   international	   relations	   fails	   to	   take	   into	  account	   the	  multiple	   interactions	   that	   take	  place	  between	  entities	   in	   the	   international	  realm.	   Throughout	   human	   history,	   people,	   networks,	   institutions,	   and	   polities	   have	  emulated,	   coerced,	   and	  borrowed	  and	  stolen	   from	  each	  other	  –	   there	   is	   a	   sociological	  content	   to	   how	   these	   multiple	   entities	   have	   engaged	   with	   each	   other.	   These	  promiscuous	  interactions,	  allied	  to	  the	  uneven	  histories	  within	  which	  social	  orders	  are	  forged,	  are	  constitutive	  of	  how	  revolutions	  arise.	  To	  take	  one	  example:	  as	  Leon	  Trotsky	  (1997)	   argued	   in	   his	   account	   of	   the	   Bolshevik	   Revolution,	   British	   and	   German	  industrialization	   acted	   as	   ‘external	   whips’	   on	   Russian	   development.	   The	   success	   of	  Britain	   and	   Germany	   forced	   Russian	   elites	   to	   import	   ‘advanced’	   technologies	   and	  organizational	  systems	  en	  masse.	  However,	  Russia’s	  social	  order	  was	  quite	  different	  in	  both	   form	   and	   content	   to	   that	   found	   in	   Britain	   and	   Germany	   –	   it	   was	   home	   to	   an	  unstable	  mixture	  of	   ‘advanced’	  and	  ‘archaic’	  (Trotsky	  1997).	  For	  Trotsky,	  the	  desire	  to	  ‘catch-­‐up’	  with	  more	   ‘advanced’	   states	   succeeded	  only	   in	   fermenting	  domestic	  unrest.	  And	  this	  dynamic	  was	  not	  specific	  to	  Russia	  alone;	  rather,	  it	  was	  replicated	  by	  many	  of	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Russia’s	   contemporaries,	   including	  Bismarckian	  Prussia	   and	  Meiji	   Japan,	   as	  well	   as	   in	  many	  subsequent	  ‘modernizing	  missions’	  around	  the	  world	  (Chibber	  2013).	  	  	  This	  insight	  produces	  two	  types	  of	  enquiry,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  concerned	  with	  how	  the	  plurality	   of	   entities	   is	   conjoined	  with	   interactivity	   between	   entities	   in	   order	   to	   foster	  revolutions.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  descriptive	   intersocietal	  approach.	  A	  descriptive	  intersocietal	  approach	   tracks	   the	   empirical	   connections	   between	   differentially	   located,	   but	  interactively	   engaged,	   social	   sites	   –	   previous	   sections	   highlighted	   examples	   from	   the	  French	  and	  Haitian	  revolutionary	  experiences.	  For	  all	  their	  richness,	  however,	  accounts	  that	   draw	   out	   these	   descriptive	   intersocietal	   connections	   do	   little	   to	   foster	   a	   second	  goal:	  the	  elucidating	  of	  the	  analytical	  advantages	  contained	  in	  an	  intersocietal	  approach.	  An	   analytical	   intersocietal	   approach	   is	   centered	   on	   the	   social	   logics	   through	   which	  differentially	   located,	   but	   interactively	   engaged,	   social	   sites	   affect	   causal	   pathways	  (Rosenberg	   2006).	   When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   study	   of	   revolutions,	   these	   analytical	  interactions	  take	  many	  forms:	  the	  pressures	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  fusion	  of	  ‘advanced’	  technologies	   in	   ‘backward’	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy,	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   support	   by	   a	  patron,	   the	   transmission	   of	   revolutionary	   ideas	   and	   techniques	   across	   borders,	   the	  transnational	   diffusion	   of	   contentious	   performances,	   the	   desire	   to	   emulate	   both	  revolutionary	  and	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  strategies,	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  next	  section	  of	   the	  paper	   illustrates	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   descriptive	   and	   analytical	   intersocietal	   dynamics	  affect	  revolutionary	  situations,	  trajectories,	  and	  outcomes.	  	  	  
Revolutionary	  situations	  	  A	   revolutionary	   situation	   is	   defined	   by	   a	   regime	   and	   an	   opposition	   advancing	  competing,	   but	   exclusive,	   claims	   to	   the	   same	  polity	   (Tilly	   1993:	   10).	   The	   connections	  between	   revolutionary	   situations	   and	   intersocietal	   dynamics	   are	   clear.	   Revolutionary	  situations	  are	  more	  prone	   to	  emerge	   in	  eras	  of	   international	  upheaval,	   in	  which	   state	  effectiveness	   is	   threatened	   by	   inter-­‐state	   conflicts,	   economic	   crisis,	   and	   shifts	   in	  prevailing	   patterns	   of	   hierarchy,	   authority,	   and	   rule.11	  In	   short,	   revolutions	   thrive	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  exceptions	  to	  this	  rule.	  For	  example,	  revolutions	  in	  Iran	  and	  Cuba	  took	  place	  without	  a	  major	  opening	  in	  international	  relations.	  Yet	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  these	  revolutions	  were	  without	  intersocietal	  causes:	  Iranian	  revolutionaries	  benefited	  from	  post-­‐Vietnam	  fatigue	  amongst	  US	  policy	  makers	  and	  publics,	  while	  Cuban	  revolutionaries	  benefitted	  from	  relatively	  favorable	  international	  press	  coverage,	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‘abnormal	  times’,	  a	  point	  recognized	  vividly	  by	  Mao:	  ‘there	  is	  great	  chaos	  under	  Heaven;	  the	   situation	   is	   excellent’.	   In	   this	   sense,	   both	   the	   breakdown	   of	   semi-­‐colonial	  monarchies	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  and	  the	  winding-­‐down	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  at	   its	  end	  acted	  as	  a	  spur	   for	  revolutionary	  change.	   In	  the	  case	  of	   the	   former,	   the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Persian,	  Ottoman,	  and	  Chinese	  monarchies	  both	  constituted	  and	  induced	  a	   ‘crisis	   period’	   that	   fostered	   the	   conditions	   for	   revolutionary	   situations	   to	   emerge	  (Hobsbawm	  1986:	  18).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter,	  as	  long	  as	  revolutionaries	  framed	  their	  story	   as	   one	   of	   a	   ‘return	   to	   normalcy’,	   emancipation	   from	   the	   Soviet	   yoke,	   or	   as	  liberation	  from	  a	  system	  whose	  time	  had	  past,	  so	  the	  great	  powers	  welcomed	  what	  had	  previously	  been	  outcast	  states	  into	  international	  society	  (Lawson	  2005:	  228).	  	  	  Changes	  in	  the	  international	  system	  therefore	  act	  as	  the	  fuel	  for	  revolutionary	  change	  –	  hence	  the	  rapid	  increase	  in	  revolutions	  at	  the	  end	  of	  world	  wars	  and	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  empires	  (Beissinger,	  2014:	  21).	  Crises	  of	   international	  order,	   featuring	  breakdowns	  in	   extant	   international	   hierarchies,	   often	   prefigure	   ‘revolutionary	  waves’	   –	   ‘groups	   of	  revolutions	   with	   similar	   objectives’	   (Katz	   1997:	   11;	   also	   see	   Markoff	   1996;	   Sohrabi	  2002;	  Beck	  2011).	  For	  example,	  the	  rise	  of	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev,	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  forces	   from	  Afghanistan,	  and	  the	  removal	  of	   the	  military	  guarantee	   for	  client	  states	  at	  the	  end	  of	   the	  1980s	  had	  a	  decisive	   impact	  on	   the	   collapse	  of	   communism	   in	  Eastern	  and	   Central	   Europe	   (Lawson	   2005).	   Soviet	   military	   failure	   (in	   Afghanistan)	   and	  economic	  weakness	   (made	  apparent	  by	   stagflation	   in	   the	  1970s),	   along	  with	  a	   loss	  of	  faith	   in	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	   as	   a	   political	   ideology	   (for	   example,	   through	   the	   challenge	  presented	   by	   ‘new	   thinking’	   in	   the	   early-­‐to-­‐mid	   1980s),	   prompted	   revolutions	   in	   a	  group	  of	  states	  subordinated	  or	  affiliated	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Katz	  1997:	  84;	  Halliday	  1999).	   In	   the	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   era,	   revolutionary	   waves	   are	   intensifying	   as	   liberal	  markets,	   democratization,	   and	   ideas	   of	   individual	   autonomy	   (as	   vested	   in	   the	   human	  rights	   regime)	   foster	   a	   set	   of	   transgressive	   repertoires	   that	   threaten	   the	   hold	   of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  (Beck	  2011;	  Beissinger	  2014).	  	  States	   most	   susceptible	   to	   these	   openings	   are	   those	   on	   the	   semi-­‐periphery	   of	   the	  international	   system,	  dependent	   geo-­‐politically	   and	   economically	   on	  other	   states,	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  particularly	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times.	  My	  thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  reviewer	  for	  pointing	  me	  to	  these	  examples.	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facing	   challenges	   to	   ‘modernize’	   from	  more	   ‘advanced’	   states	   (Goldfrank	   1975,	   1979;	  Skocpol	   1979).	   As	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   drive	   to	   carry	   out	   ‘modernizing	  missions’	   can	   foster	   unstable	   amalgams	   of	   ‘modern’	   and	   ‘archaic’	   (Trotksy	   1997;	  Chibber	   2013).	   Pertinent	   examples	   include	   Mexico,	   Turkey,	   Russia,	   Iran,	   and	  contemporary	  Egypt.	  Revolutionary	  situations	  emerge	  when	  the	  dual	  (geopolitical	  and	  economic)	   dependency	   of	   states	   becomes	   unsustainable,	   and	   when	   the	   amalgam	   of	  ‘modern’	   and	   ‘archaic’	   fosters	   state	   crisis.	   In	   other	   words,	   revolutionary	   conditions	  surface	  in	  states	  when	  the	  ruling	  regime	  does	  not	  cope	  effectively	  with	  these	  challenges	  and	  when	  an	  opposition	  group	  emerges	  that	  espouses	  an	  alternative	  political	  ideology,	  holds	   sufficient	   resources	   to	   provide	   a	   credible	   challenge,	   and	   carries	   the	   support	   of	  significant	   social	   groups	   (Lawson	   2005:	   71).	   This	   opposition	   is	   given	   space	   for	  maneuver	   by	   the	   ‘expanded	   access’	   fostered	   by	   shifts	   in	   intersocietal	   ties	   and	   the	  ‘unstable	  alignments’	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  failure	  of	  some	  regimes	  to	  cope	  effectively	  with	  these	  shifts	  (Tarrow	  2012:	  78-­‐80).	   Intersocietal	  relations	  serve	  as	  the	  causal	  crucibles	  that	  allow	  revolutionary	  movements	  the	  opportunity	  to	  redefine	  their	  positions.	  	  	  In	   this	   way,	   intersocietal	   relations	   play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   onset	   of	   revolutionary	  situations.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  2011	  Arab	  uprisings,	  Egypt	  was	  the	   second	   largest	   recipient	   of	   US	   aid	   (worth	   around	   $1	   billion	   dollars	   per	   year	   in	  military	  aid	  alone),	  one	  of	  the	  main	  sites	  for	  the	  torture	  and	  rendition	  of	  suspected	  al-­‐Qaida	  suspects,	  and	  a	  supporter	  of	  Israeli	  policies	  in	  the	  region,	  including	  the	  blockade	  of	   Gaza.	   These	   policies	   generated	   a	   sense	   of	   alienation	   between	   the	   regime	   and	   the	  people.	  According	  to	  the	  2010	  Pew	  Global	  Attitudes	  Survey,	  82%	  of	  Egyptians	  strongly	  disapproved	   of	   the	   United	   States	   (up	   from	   69%	   five	   years	   earlier).	   The	   lack	   of	  legitimacy	   associated	  with	   these	   policies,	   added	   to	   the	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   nature	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  state	  and	  its	  incapacity	  to	  deliver	  basic	  public	  goods,	  were	  fundamental	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  situation	   in	  Egypt.	  So	   too	  was	   the	  revolution	   in	  Tunisia,	  which	  acted	  as	  a	  stimulus	  for	  protest	   in	  Egypt	  and	  other	  states	   in	  the	  region,	  whether	  this	  was	  through	  demonstration	  effect,	  cascades,	  or	  deliberate	  emulation	  (Patel,	  Bunce,	  and	  Wolchik	   2011;	  Weyland	   2012;	   Hale	   2013).12	  Indeed,	   the	   protests	   in	   Tunisia	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  closeness	  of	  the	  ties	  between	  ruling	  families	  and	  their	  coteries	  also	  fuelled	  diffusion	  effects	  –	  their	  similar	  modes	  of	  rule	  meant	  that	  they	  shared	  similar	  vulnerabilities	  (Owen	  2012).	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Egypt	   spread	   around	   the	   region	   and	   beyond,	   spurring	   movements	   in	   Mauritania,	  Djibouti,	  and	  Sudan	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  Bahrain,	  Syria,	  Yemen,	  Oman,	  Libya,	  and	  Jordan.	  	  	  Revolutions,	   therefore,	   have	   causes	   that	   are	   necessarily	   rooted	   in	   intersocietal	  dynamics.	   Descriptively,	   intersocietal	   dynamics	   are	   evidenced	   by	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  protests	  spread	  beyond	  their	  immediate	  points	  of	  departure	  –	  as	  with	  Haiti	  in	  1791,	  so	  with	  Poland	  in	  1989	  and	  Tunisia	  in	  2011.	  Analytically,	  an	  intersocietal	  account	  points	  to	  a	  range	  of	  important	  mechanisms:	  the	  role	  of	  ‘abnormal	  times’	  in	  heightening	  demands	  for	   revolution;	   the	   ‘unstable	   alignments’	   prompted	  by	   shifting	   client-­‐patron	   relations;	  the	   rise	  and	   fall	  of	   revolutionary	  waves,	  and	  more.	  Taken	   together,	   these	   issues	  point	  towards	  a	  fertile	  research	  agenda	  that	  is,	  as	  yet,	  sketched-­‐out	  rather	  than	  filled-­‐in.	  	  	  
Revolutionary	  trajectories	  Intersocietal	  relations	  are	  also	  central	  to	  revolutionary	  trajectories,	  not	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  close-­‐knit	  identity	  within	  the	  revolutionary	  movement.	  The	  identity	  of	   revolutionary	   movements	   is	   drawn	   from	   cultural	   tropes	   that	   encompass	   a	  promiscuous	   blend	   of	   the	   local	   and	   the	   transnational:	   protestors	   in	   Tehran	   in	   1979	  wore	  Che	  Guevara	  t-­‐shirts,	  just	  as	  revolutionaries	  around	  the	  world	  sang	  local	  variants	  of	   the	   Internationale	  or,	  more	   recently,	  donned	  Guy	  Fawkes	  masks	   (Selbin	  2010;	  also	  see	  Sohrabi	  1995;	  Beck	  2011).	  These	   ‘repertoires’	  are	  the	  building	  blocks	  of	   identities	  that	   legitimate	   and	   sustain	   the	   revolutionary	   struggle	   (Tilly	   2008).	   Revolutionary	  repertoires	   tend	   to	   be	   drawn	   from	   existing	   cultural	   resources	   –	   they	   are	   ‘learned	  clusters	   of	   historically	   situated	   actions’	   (Tilly	   2008:	   4-­‐5).	   For	   example,	   strikes,	  demonstrations,	   and	   rallies	   are	   well-­‐established	   ‘rhythms’	   of	   revolutionary	   protest.	  However,	  revolutionary	  repertoires	  are	  also	  innovative,	  more	  associated	  with	  ‘jazz’	  than	  the	  ‘ritual	  reading	  of	  scripture’	  (Tilly	  2008:	  14).	  The	  emergence	  and	  institutionalization	  of	   repertoires	   ranging	   from	   factory	  sit-­‐ins	   to	  occupations	   illustrate	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  protests	   both	   draw	   upon,	   but	   also	   go	   beyond,	   existing	   symbolic	   schemas.	   The	   most	  successful	  of	  these	  repertoires	  have	  transnational	  appeal,	  becoming	  deployed	  in	  a	  range	  of	  settings	  (Beissinger	  2007:	  74-­‐7;	  Bunce	  and	  Wolchik	  2007:	  96),	  combining	  ‘symbolic	  resonance’	   (their	   cultural	   meaning	   translates	   to	   multiple	   contexts)	   and	   ‘strategic	  modularity’	   (their	   associated	  practices	  work	   in	  different	   settings)	   (Tarrow	  2013:	  18).	  Repertoires	   diffuse	   transnationally	   through	   impersonal	   networks	   (such	   as	   forms	   of	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media),	  and	  through	  the	  personal	  connections	   fostered	  by	  revolutionary	  brokers,	  who	  have	   the	   capacity	   both	   to	   ‘externalize’	   local	   frames	   in	   diverse	   settings	   and	   to	  ‘internalize’	   frames	   drawn	   from	   outside	   a	   polity	   (Bunce	   and	   Wolchik	   2007:	   93-­‐7;	  Tarrow	   2012:	   174).	   Revolutionary	   repertoires	   are	   symbolic	   vehicles	   of	   mobilization	  drawn	  from	  an	  intimate	  connection	  between	  local	  and	  transnational.	  	  	  Beyond	   the	   intersocietal	  dimensions	  of	   revolutionary	  repertoires	   lies	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  connections	   between	   local	   and	   transnational	   revolutionary	   actors.	   For	   instance,	  revolutionary	   ‘entrepreneurs’	   play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   linking	   local	   and	   transnational	  struggles,	  as	  witnessed	  by	  the	  spread	  of	  non-­‐violent	  strategies	  (Schock	  2005;	  Nepstad	  2011;	  Tarrow	  2012:	  78-­‐80).	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  revolutionaries	  in	   Russia,	   Iran,	   Turkey,	   and	   elsewhere	   sought	   radical	   change	   not	   through	   violent	  overthrow,	  but	   through	  struggles	   that	   sought	   to	   shift	   sovereignty	  away	   from	   imperial	  courts	   towards	   representative	   assemblies,	   written	   constitutions,	   and	   legal-­‐rational	  bureaucracies	   (Sohrabi	   1995;	   Kurzman	   2008).	   This	   form	   of	   struggle	   remained	  somewhat	   latent	  until	   the	  1970s,	  when	  non-­‐violent	  protests	   became	   regular	   forms	  of	  protest.	  Of	  the	  67	  authoritarian	  regimes	  dismantled	  between	  1972	  and	  2002,	  over	  70%	  were	   the	   result	   of	   non-­‐violent	   uprisings	   (Nepstad	   2011:	   4-­‐5).	   Advocates	   stress	   the	  advantages	   of	   non-­‐violent	   repertoires	   in:	   widening	   participation	   and	   broadening	  coalitions	  (Chenoweth	  and	  Stephan	  2011:	  10);	  ratcheting-­‐up	  international	  pressure	  on	  incumbents	   (Schock	   2005:	   54);	   and	   in	   inducing	   defections	   within	   the	   ruling	   elite,	  thereby	  weakening	  the	  ‘sanctioning	  power’	  of	  the	  state	  (Nepstad	  2011:	  126).	  As	  a	  result,	  it	   is	  claimed,	  non-­‐violent	  campaigns	  have	  been	  twice	  as	  successful	  as	  violent	  struggles	  (Chenoweth	  and	  Stephan	  2008:	  8).	  These	  strategies	  have	  been	  adopted	  –	  and	  adapted	  –	  by	   a	   range	   of	   contemporary	   revolutionary	   movements,	   from	   those	   that	   ousted	   state	  bureaucratic	   regimes	   in	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe	   in	   1989	   (Lawson	   2005),	   to	   the	  2011	  uprisings	  in	  North	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Ritter	  2015).	  	  	  An	   intersocietal	   approach	   also	   aids	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  timing	   of	   protest	   and	   the	   likelihood	   of	   their	   success.	   In	   1989,	   the	   electoral	   victory	   of	  Solidarity	   in	   Poland,	   negotiations	   in	   Hungary,	   and	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   Berlin	   Wall	   in	  November	  appeared	  as	   ‘a	  chain	  of	  spectacular	   transformations’	   that	  made	  revolutions	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in	  neighbouring	  states	  appear	  to	  be	  inevitable	  (Lévesque	  2010).13	  The	  relative	  success	  of	   these	   movements	   stands	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   tendency	   of	   revolutionary	   waves	   to	  become	   less	   successful	   the	   further	   they	   travel	   from	   their	   original	   point	   of	   instigation	  (Beissinger	  2007;	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Tarrow	  2012:	  122).	  A	  major	  reason	  why	   this	   is	   the	  case	   lies	   in	   the	   capacity	   of	   authoritarian	   regimes	   to	   learn	   how	   to	   demobilize	   their	  challengers.	   During	   the	   2011	   Arab	   uprisings,	   for	   example,	   protests	   in	   Bahrain	   were	  crushed	   by	   a	   combination	   of	   monarchical	   obduracy	   and	   Saudi	   force.	   Through	   the	  vehicle	   of	   the	   Gulf	   Cooperation	   Council	   (GCC),	   the	   Saudis	   sent	   troops	   and	   police	   into	  Bahrain	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  regime	  against	  protest,	  following	  this	  with	  large	  supplies	  of	  petrodollars	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  appease	  protestors.	  The	  Saudis	  also	  gave	   Jordan	  a	  $1	  billion	   ‘gift’	   and	  offered	  a	  $4	  billion	   ‘grant’	   to	  Egypt,	  while	  mollifying	  domestic	  unrest	  through	  a	  reform	  package	  worth	  over	  $150	  billion	  (Lynch	  2012:	  131).	  This	  strategy,	  on	  a	   lesser	   scale,	  was	  also	   initiated	   in	  Kuwait,	  Morocco,	   and	   Jordan,	  with	   similar	   results:	  the	   decompression	   of	   protest.	   Together,	   GCC	   states	   promised	   (even	   if	   they	   did	   not	  always	   deliver)	   billions	   of	   dollars	   of	   aid	   around	   the	   region	   in	   a	   counterrevolutionary	  strategy	  that,	  to	  some	  extent,	  acted	  as	  a	  brake	  on	  the	  uprisings.	  	  	  Once	  again,	  therefore,	  an	  intersocietal	  approach	  delivers	  both	  descriptive	  and	  analytical	  insights.	  Descriptively,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  trace	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  revolutionaries	  seek	  to	  emulate	   and	   extend	   the	   revolutionary	   experience	   within	   transnational	   fields	   of	  contention,	   as	   discussed	   earlier	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  Haitian	   revolution	   and	   above	   in	  respect	  to	  the	  Arab	  uprisings.	  Analytically,	  an	  intersocietal	  approach	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	   brokerage	   role	   of	   revolutionary	   entrepreneurs,	   the	   ‘externalization’	   and	  ‘internalization’	   of	   revolutionary	   repertoires,	   the	   closeness	   of	   the	   dynamic	   between	  revolutionary	   and	   counter-­‐revolutionary	   forces,	   and	   more.	   As	   with	   revolutionary	  situations,	   study	   of	   the	   intersocietal	   features	   of	   revolutionary	   trajectories	   serves	   as	   a	  potentially	  profitable	  field	  of	  enquiry.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  There	  is	  increasing	  evidence	  that	  Chinese	  leaders	  saw	  these	  ‘spectacular	  transformations’	  as	  a	  transnational	  wave	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  spread	  well	  beyond	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  military	  against	  protestors	  in	  Tiananmen	  Square	  was	  closely	  bound	  up	  with	  fear	  of	  revolutionary	  contagion,	  not	  least	  because	  China	  was	  already	  witnessing	  protests	  linked	  to	  rising	  prices	  and	  the	  death	  of	  the	  reform-­‐minded	  Party	  General	  Secretary,	  Hu	  Yaobang.	  On	  the	  reaction	  of	  Chinese	  leaders	  to	  the	  events	  of	  1989,	  see	  Sarotte	  (2012).	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Revolutionary	  outcomes	  The	   final	   illustration	  of	   the	  promise	  of	  an	   intersocietal	  approach	   lies	   in	   the	   insights	   it	  provides	  into	  analysis	  of	  revolutionary	  outcomes.	  Here,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  intersocietal	  effects	  of	   revolution	  endure	   long	  after	   the	   initial	  promise	  of	   revolution	  has	   faded.	  For	  example,	   the	   Bolsheviks’	   ‘Decree	   on	   Peace’	   in	   November	   1917	   called	   for	   revolution	  throughout	  Europe	  and	  Asia,	  and	  was	  sustained	  by	  a	  two	  million	  ruble	  fund	  to	  support	  international	  revolution.	  Although	  the	  short-­‐term	  success	  of	  the	  Bolsheviks	  in	  fostering	  revolution	  was	  slight,	  by	  1950	  a	  third	  of	  humanity	  lived	  under	  regimes	  that	  took	  their	  inspiration	   from	   the	   Russian	   Revolution	   –	   a	   Tsarist	   empire	   covering	   one-­‐sixth	   of	   the	  size	   of	   globe	   had	   been	   disbanded	   and	   put	   back	   together.	   In	   comparable	   vein,	   Cuba	  provided	   troops	   for	   the	   liberation	   movement	   in	   Angola,	   as	   well	   as	   advisers	   and	  technical	  support	  to	  a	  number	  of	  allied	  regimes	  around	  the	  world.	  Other	  revolutions	  can	  claim	  almost	  as	  great	  an	  impact,	  not	  least	  the	  Chinese	  Revolution	  and	  its	  demonstration	  of	  the	  radical	  potential	  of	  the	  peasantry.	  Revolutions,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  example	  they	  set	  in	  overcoming	  apparently	   insurmountable	  forces	  generate	  substantial	  changes	  both	  to	  the	  texture	  of	  their	  home	  societies	  and	  to	  wider	  strands	  of	  international	  order.	  	  	  Beyond	   the	  material	   aid	  offered	  by	   revolutionary	   states	   to	  other	  polities	   is	   a	   broader	  notion	   of	   revolutionary	   states	   as	   examples-­‐to-­‐be-­‐emulated	   (Kurzman	   2008).	   For	  instance,	  after	  the	  1688	  Glorious	  Revolution	  in	  England,	  the	  Treasury	  stood	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   a	   system	   of	   public	   finance	   that	   provided	   predictable,	   secure,	   reliable	   revenue	   and	  credit.	   In	   1689,	   a	   Bill	   of	   Rights	   was	   passed,	   forbidding	   taxation	   through	   royal	  prerogative	   and	   royal	   interference	   in	   elections.	   The	   National	   Debt	   was	   instituted	   in	  1693,	   to	  be	  managed	  the	   following	  year	  by	   the	  newly	  created	  Bank	  of	  England.	  These	  policies,	  along	  with	  the	  ‘hidden	  sinews’	  of	  public	  administration,	  constructed	  a	  means	  of	  revenue	   raising	   and	   credit	   provision	   that	   gave	   England	   a	   decisive	   advantage	   over	   its	  competitors:	   between	   1688	   and	   1697,	   annual	   tax	   revenues	   in	   England	   doubled;	   they	  doubled	  again	  between	  1697	  and	  1714	  (Brewer	  1990:	  89;	  Ertman	  1987:	  214;	  Hui	  2005:	  126).	   An	   interlocking	   system	   of	   parliamentary	   oversight,	   public	   finances,	   and	   credit	  markets	   operated	   as	   a	   ‘structural	   check’	   on	   monarchical	   power,	   turning	   parliament	  ‘from	  an	   event	   into	   an	   institution’	   (Ertman	  1997:	   200-­‐1;	   Pincus	   2012).	   In	   this	  way,	   a	  ‘non-­‐proprietary	   fiscal-­‐military	   bureaucracy’	   presided	   over	   an	   efficient	   state	  administration	  with	   considerable	   infrastructural	   reach	   (Ertman	   1997:	   187).	  Whereas	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French	   absolutism	   and	   the	   Dutch	   Republic	   served	   as	   models	   for	   sixteenth	   and	  seventeenth	  century	  European	  states,	  it	  was	  the	  English	  ‘fiscal-­‐military	  juggernaut’	  that	  served	  as	  a	  model	   to	  eighteenth	  century	   states	  and	   revolutionaries,	  not	   least	   those	   in	  North	  America	  (Bailyn	  1967;	  Brewer	  1990:	  251).	  	  Revolutions	  therefore	  challenge	  international	  order	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  ranging	  from	  disrupting	  existing	  patterns	  of	  trade	  and	  inter-­‐state	  alliances	  to	  questioning	  underlying	  rules,	   norms,	   and	   principles.	  Haiti,	   discussed	   above,	   serves	   as	   one	   such	   example.	   The	  Bolshevik	  revolution	  in	  Russia	  provides	  a	  second.	  The	  challenges	  of	  the	  1917	  revolution	  were	   short-­‐term	   (prompting	   the	  withdrawal	   of	  Russian	   forces	   from	  World	  War	  One),	  medium-­‐term	   (in	   the	   provision	   of	   support	   for	   like-­‐minded	   movements	   –	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   invaded	   Poland	   in	   1920,	   provided	   aid	   for	   German	   revolutionaries	   in	   1923,	  supported	   the	   republicans	  during	   the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War	   from	  1936-­‐39,	   and	  helped	   to	  install	  socialist	  regimes	  in	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  during	  the	  late	  1940s),	  and	  long-­‐term	  (in	  the	  establishment	   of	   a	   systemic	   alternative	   to	   market-­‐democracy).	   As	   with	   other	  revolutions,	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   Bolshevik	   revolution	   included	   new	   military	   and	  economic	  alliances	  that,	  in	  turn,	  induced	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  revolutionary	  state	  and	  a	   counter-­‐revolutionary	   coalition	   that	   sought	   to	   contain	   it.	   The	   Bolshevik	   revolution,	  like	  those	  in	  Haiti,	  France,	  China,	  Cuba,	  Iran,	  and	  elsewhere	  challenged	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	   existing	   international	   system	   and,	   with	   it,	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   system’s	   great	  powers.	   This,	   naturally,	   prompted	   a	   response:	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   their	   position	   at	   the	  apex	   of	   the	   international	   system,	   great	   powers	   must	   act	   decisively	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	  revolutionary	   challenge	   (Bisley	   2004:	   56).	   Occasionally,	   this	   action	   takes	   place	   in	  support	   of	   the	   revolutionary	  movement,	   as	  with	   the	   1989	   revolutions	   in	   Central	   and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  More	  frequently,	  great	  powers	  act	  to	  suppress	  such	  revolutions,	  seeing	  them	  as	  threats	  to	  international	  order,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Haiti,	  France,	  Russia,	  Algeria,	  Vietnam,	   and	   elsewhere.14	  In	   this	   way,	   counter-­‐revolution	   should	   not	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  instrumental	   reaction	   to	   moments	   of	   revolutionary	   upheaval,	   but	   as	   a	   process	   hard-­‐wired	  into	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  international	  relations	  itself	  (Mayer	  1977).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Oftentimes,	  counter-­‐revolution	  has	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  carrot	  rather	  than	  stick.	  For	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  rationales	  for	  the	  US	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  programme,	  which	  pumped	  billions	  of	  dollars	  into	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  1960s,	  was	  to	  halt	  the	  ‘virus’	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  from	  contaminating	  other	  states	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
	   24	  
If	  the	  relationship	  between	  revolution	  and	  counter-­‐revolution	  is	  tightly	  meshed,	  so	  too	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  revolution	  and	  war.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  revolutionary	  states	  are	   far	  more	   likely	   than	   other	   states	   to	   enter	   into	   violent	   civil	  war:	   over	   one	  million	  people	   died	   in	   the	   Mexican	   revolution	   and	   the	   country’s	   subsequent	   civil	   unrest	  between	  1910-­‐17,	  around	  three	  million	  people	  died	  in	  the	  Russian	  revolution	  and	  civil	  war	  between	  1917-­‐20,	  and	  close	  to	  five	  million	  Chinese	  were	  killed	  in	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  Mao’s	  post-­‐1949	  revolutionary	   regime	   (Beissinger	  2014:	  6;	  Westad	  2012:	  322).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   revolutionary	   states	  are	   twice	  as	   likely	  as	  non-­‐revolutionary	  states	   to	  induce	   inter-­‐state	  war	   (Maoz	   1989:	   204).	   As	   Stephen	  Walt	   (1996)	   notes,	   revolutions	  intensify	   the	   prospects	   of	  war	   in	   three	  ways.	   First,	   revolutions	   provide	   a	   ‘window	   of	  opportunity’	   for	   states	   to	   improve	   their	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   states	   –	   because	  revolutionary	  regimes	  are	  beset	  by	  civil	  strife	  and	  elite	  fracture,	  other	  states	  may	  seize	  the	   chance	   to	   attack	   the	   revolutionary	   regime.	   Second,	   this	   ‘window	   of	   opportunity’	  generates	  ‘spirals	  of	  suspicion’	  as	  the	  uncertainty	  produced	  by	  the	  revolution	  heightens	  levels	   of	   insecurity	   that,	   in	   turn,	   raise	   perceptions	   of	   threat	   (Walt	   1996:	   33).	   Finally,	  revolutionary	  states	  seek	   to	  export	   their	   revolution	  both	  as	  a	  way	  of	   shoring	  up	   their	  fragile	  position	  at	  home	  and	  because	  of	  their	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  an	  alternative	  international	   order.	   Concomitantly,	   counter-­‐revolutionary	   states	   assume	   that	   the	  revolution	   will	   spread	   unless	   it	   is	   ‘strangled	   in	   its	   crib’	   and	   that	   revolution	   will	   be	  relatively	  easy	  to	  reverse	  (Walt	  1996:	  43).	  This	  ‘perverse	  combination’	  of	  insecurity	  and	  overconfidence	   heightens	   the	   prospects	   of	   inter-­‐state	   conflict	   (Walt	   1996:	   40).	   By	  increasing	   uncertainty	   and	   fear,	   by	   altering	   capabilities,	   and	   by	   raising	   threat	  perceptions,	  revolutionary	  states	  begin	  a	  process	  that,	  quite	  often,	  engenders	  inter-­‐state	  conflict.	  War	  between	  revolutionary	  and	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  forces	  emerges	  from	  an	  ‘over-­‐reaction	  to	  over-­‐perceived	  revolutionary	  dangers’	  (Mayer	  1977:	  202).	  	  	  Many	   of	   the	   descriptive	   advantages	   of	   an	   intersocietal	   approach	   to	   understanding	  revolutionary	   outcomes	   have	   been	   outlined	   earlier	   in	   the	   paper	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	  Haiti	   and	  France.	  Attention	   to	   the	   analytical	   components	   of	   an	   intersocietal	   approach	  includes	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  revolutions,	  counter-­‐revolution,	  and	  war,	  as	  well	   as	   the	  material	   aid	   and	  more	   intangible	   aspects	   of	   ‘demonstration	   effect’	   that	  revolutions	   afford	   to	   other	   states.	   Even	   if	   goals	   of	   world	   revolution	   are	   rarely	  attempted,	  let	  alone	  achieved,	  revolutions	  play	  influential	  roles	  in	  inspiring	  the	  growth	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of	  protest	  movements	  and	  reform	  programmes	  overseas	  (Halliday	  1999).	  From	  England	  and	  Haiti	   to	   Iran	   and	   Tunisia,	   revolutions	   generate	   knock-­‐on	   effects	   that	   spread	  well	  beyond	  their	  point	  of	  instigation.	  	  	  
The	  promise	  of	  an	  intersocietal	  approach	  The	   promise	   of	   an	   intersocietal	   approach	   rests	   on	   its	   capacity	   to	   theorize	   what	  otherwise	   appears	   as	   empirical	   surplus:	   the	   social	   logics	   contained	   within	   the	  intersocietal	   dynamics	   that	   constitute	   revolutionary	   processes.	   The	   concatenations	   of	  events	  through	  which	  revolutions	  emerge	  are	  dynamically	  related	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  social	  relations	  within	  territories	  interact	  with	  those	  beyond	  their	  borders.	  Intersocietal	  relations	   form	  an	   interactive	   crucible	   for	   each	   and	   every	   case	   of	   revolution,	   from	   the	  desire	  to	  ‘catch-­‐up’	  with	  more	  ‘advanced’	  states	  to	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  in	  fermenting	  unrest	  across	   state	   borders.	   The	   ‘external	   whip’	   of	   international	   pressures,	   added	   to	   the	  uneven	  histories	  within	  which	  social	  orders	  develop,	  produce	  an	  intersocietal	  logic	  that	  has	  not,	  as	  yet,	  been	  effectively	  theorized	  in	  the	  study	  of	  revolutions.15	  It	  is	  the	  task	  of	  an	  intersocietal	  approach	  to	  identify	  these	  dynamics	  and	  demonstrate	  their	  generative	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  revolutionary	  processes.	  Although	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  both	  analytically	  and	  descriptively	   to	  avoid	  using	  nation-­‐state	   frames,	   there	   is	  no	  sociological	   rationale	  for	   maintaining	   the	   bifurcation	   between	   international	   and	   domestic.	   Revolutions	   are	  complex	  amalgams	  of	  transnational	  and	  local	  fields	  of	  action.	  	  	  Although,	  as	  noted	  above,	  aspects	  of	  an	  intersocietal	  approach	  can	  be	  found	  in	  existing	  work	  on	   revolutions	   (e.g.	  Goldfrank	  1975,	  1979;	  Skocpol	  1979,	  Foran	  2005;	  Kurzman	  2008;	  Goldstone	  2001,	  2009,	  2014;	  Selbin	  2010;	  Beck	  2014),	  this	  scholarship	  tends	  to	  graft	   the	   international	   features	   of	   revolutions	   onto	   existing	   theoretical	   scaffolding,	  thereby	  reproducing	  the	  analytical	  bifurcation	  between	  international	  and	  domestic,	  and	  giving	  primary	  causal	  weight	  to	  endogenous	  processes.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  although	  some	  of	   the	   descriptive	   components	   of	   an	   intersocietal	   approach	   can	   be	   found	   in	  transnational	  histories	  of	  revolution	  (e.g.	  Stone	  2002;	  Armitage,	  2007;	  Adelman	  2008;	  Hunt	   2010),	   the	   analytical	   dimensions	   of	   an	   intersocietal	   approach	   have	   not,	   as	   yet,	  been	   systematically	   interrogated.	   This	   paper	   has	   provided	   a	   first-­‐cut	   at	   such	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  A	  partial	  exception	  is	  the	  Marxist	  debate	  on	  uneven	  and	  combined	  development.	  On	  this,	  see:	  Deutscher	  (1984);	  Horowitz	  (1969);	  Matin	  (2006);	  and	  Rosenberg	  (2006).	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approach,	   outlining	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   international	   dynamics,	   ranging	   from	   the	  symbolic	  transmissions	  that	  accelerate	  or	  redirect	  revolutions,	  to	  broader	  dynamics	  of	  revolutionary/counter-­‐revolutionary	   contestation,	   play	   constitutive	   roles	   in	   how	  revolutions	   begin,	   endure,	   and	   end.	   Intersocietal	   interactions	   are	   less	   the	   product	   of	  revolutions	  than	  their	  drivers.	  In	  short:	  revolutions	  are	  intersocietal	  all	  the	  way	  down.	  And,	  as	  such,	  the	  promise	  of	  an	  intersocietal	  approach	  to	  revolutions	  is	  rich	  indeed.	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